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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S-TATE OF UTAH 
EARL D. TANNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M. 
LA WI~ER, his wife, 
Defendant, and Appellants, 
-vs.-
'\VALTER H. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant as Case No. 8518 
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff 
against George Beckstead as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Defendant in Intervention, and 
Respondent. 
-BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute as to the facts of this action. 
The dispute is .as to the legal effect of the acts done by 
the parties. Most of the- f~acts are as set forth in Appel-
lants' Brief, however, respondents desire to dire:ct the 
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2 
attention of the Court to some facts shown in the record 
which are either not set forth in Appellants' Brief or 
are not set forth with sufficient detail. 
At the time of the Sheriff's sale of the property 
involved in this dispute, there were outstanding against 
said property the following liens, in addition to the 
mortgage lien being foreclosed: 
1. A judgment lien of Paul Clowes resulting from 
a judgment against W. C. Lawler, dated !lay 28, 1954, 
in the amount of $1,555.48. 
2. A judgment lien of Idaho Grange Wholesale 
against W. C. Lawler dated July 13, 1954, in the amount 
of $441.38. 
3. Federal tax lien against W. C. Lawler for the 
years 1952, 1953, and 1955, in the amount of $1,412.57. 
4. A Utah State Tax lien against W. C. Lawler 
dated January 9, 1954, in the amount of $144.84. 
5. A judgment lien of ,, ... alter H. Reichert against 
"\\7• C. La,vler dated ~lay 18, 1955, in the amount of 
$4,017.20. 
The facts set forth in 1, 2, 3 and 4 ,above are shown 
in thP filP in Civil No. 103871. Pacific National Life 
A ~sura.ne.P Co1np.any· vs. }lagana, et al. which is an ex-
hi hit in this ea8P. but the pages of which are unnum-
bered. ThP facts in 5 above are shown in Stipulation of 
F1act No. 23. 
In thp said case of Paeific Natjonal Life Assurance 
Company vs. l\lagana, elt .al, both W. C. La,vler and 
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3 
Laura M. Lawler were parties defendant and answered 
concerning their claims to the property being foreclosed, 
which property was owned by them as joint tenants and 
mortgaged by both of them to the Pacific National Life 
Assurance Company. Their Answer was filed J~anuary 
11, 1955, and was never amended in any particular either 
before or after the Sheriff's sale. In that Answer neither 
W. C. Lawler nor L.aura M. Lawler made any cl,aim to 
a homestead interest in the property being foreclosed. 
(See Answer of the Lawlers in the mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings.) 
It may be well, in the interest of clarity, to chart 
the significant acts of the parties in the order of their 
occurrence. Since the principal controversy concerns 
acts subsequent to the foreclosure proceedings, we will 
not go behind the foreclosure complaint in point of time: 
December 15, 1954: Pacific National Life Assurance 
Comp.any filed Complaint against W. C. and Laura 
M. Lawler, et al, foreclosing mortgage. 
January 11, 1955: W. C. and Laura M. Lawler answered 
Complaint - no allegation of home~s,tead. 
June 1, 1955: Decree and Order of Sale on Foreclosure 
~, entered. 
June 3, 1955: Notices of Sheriff's Sale po~ted and pub-
~ lished setting time of s.ale as 12 :00 noon on July 5, 
~ 1955. 
July 5, 1955: Sheriff's sale. Property purchased by 
~ Pacific National Life Assurance Company for the 
rl) amount of the judgment. 
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July 6, 1955: Sheriff's Certificate of Sale issued to 
Pacific National and copy recorded. 
December 27, 1955: Declaration of Home-stead executed 
' by W. C. Lawler only (R. 22). 
December 28, 1955: 1. Pacific National -assigned the 
Sheriff's Certificate of .Sale to Walter H. Reichert 
for $8,821.91, (R. 23). 
2. W. C. Lawler and Walter Reichert advised by 
John W. Lowe, attorney, that Earl D. Tanner was 
interested in redeeming the property. 
December 29, 1955: (In order of occurrence) 
1. W. C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler quit-claimed 
property to W .alter H. Reichert and Sylvia L. 
Reichert. Deed specifically includes homestead in-
terest of grantors. (R. 24). 
2. 'Valter H. Reichert exhibits Assignment of Sher-
iff's Certificate of Sale, Quit-Claim Deed, and Dec-
laration of Homestead to Sheriff. 
3. Deelaration of Hotnestead of W. C. Lawler is 
recorderl, as 'veil ,as the Assignment of Sheriff's 
CPrtifieate of S.ale, and La,vler-Reichert Quit-Claim 
Deed. 
4. E·arl D. Tanner, assignee of judgment creditor 
P·aul W. (~lowes, took all steps required by statute 
for rede1nption and paid Sheriff $9,078.81 for 
Walter fl. Reiehert. 
5. Sheriff issued Certificate of Redemption to 
Earl D. Tanner, \vho recorded same. 
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6. Earl D. Tanner paid delinquent taxes on prop-
erty in .amount of $424.99. 
January 6, 1956: Sheriff's Deed is .. sued to Earl D. 
Tanner, who recorded same. . 
For the bal~ance of this brief, the Plaintiff, Earl 
D. Tanner will be referred to as "T~anner," the Defendant 
and Intervener Walter H. Reichert will be referred to 
as "Reichert" and the Defendants W. C. L.awler and 
Laura M. Lawler as "the Lawlers." George Beckstead 
will be referred to as "Sheriff" and Pacific National 
Life Assurance Company as "Pacific National." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHEN WALTER H. REICHERT PURCHASED AN AS-
SIGNMENT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE FROM 
PACIFIC NATIONAL, HE RECEIVED ALL 'THE TITLE 
THAT PACIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED AS PUR-
CHASER AT THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND NO MORE, AND 
HIS LA'TER ACQUISITION OF A QUIT-CLAIM DEED FR·OM 
THE LAWLERS DID NOT 'TERMINATE THE MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND CUT OFF LIEN 
CREDITORS' RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION. 
POINT II 
WHEN EARL D. TANNER REDEEMED 1THE PROP-
ERTY FROM WALTER H. REICHERT HE R.ECEIVED ALL 
THE RIGHTS THAT PA·CIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED 
AS PURCHASER AT 'THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND NOTH-
ING MORE, AND THEREFORE HE RECEIVED THE TITLE 
TO THE PROPERTY FREE FROM HOMESTEAD, BUT 
SUBJECT TO REDEMPTION BY OTHER LIEN CREDITORS. 
POINT III 
THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER HAVING 
BEEN SOLD BY THE SHERIFF TO PACIFIC NATIONAL 
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AT THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE, AND EARL 
D. 'TANNER HAVING SUCCEEDED !TO THE TITLE OF 
PACIFIC NATIONAL, THE SHERIFF WAS REQUIRED BY 
LAW TO CONVEY THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER 
TO EARL D. TANNER. 
POINT IV 
NO CREDITORS HAVING REDEEMED THE PROPERTY 
FROM THE REDEMPTIONER EARL D. TANNER, HE WAS 
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A SHERIFF'S DEED SIX 
MONTHS AFTER THE SHERIFF'S SALE. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED A MONEY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST WALTER H. REICHERT. 
POINT VI 
THIS COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT 
BELOW AND, IN ADDITION, DIRECT THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF BE AWARDED TRIPLE DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD 
WALTER H. REICHERT AND THE LAWLERS HAVE CON-
TINUED· TO UNLAWFULLY DETAIN THE PROPERTY 
SINCE THE JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION. 
STATEJ\IENT OF THE CASE 
This is an unla\\:ful detainer action brought by 
Earl D. Tanner, "--ho claims to be the owner of a ee·rtain 
house and lot, against his tenants at will, W. C. Lawler 
and J.~aura l\L La\\ .. ler, for the possession of the prop-
erty and for rents and drunages. 'Valter H. Reichert 
moved to intervene and beca.n1e a pa.rty to the unlawful 
<lntainer artion as a defendant and counter claimant 
on the g-round that he \\ras the o\\rner of the property, 
po~~es,sing the same through his ten~ants, the Lawlers 
(R. 12). The·re-afte·r the said Reichert stipulated that 
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7 
he was the possessor of the premises by and through 
the Lawlers and that he refused to surrender the prop-
erty to Siaid T·anner. 
The Trial Court, the Honorable David T. Lewis 
presiding, decided that the Plaintiff Tanner, was the 
owner of the property, and that the Defendants Reichert 
and Lawler were unlawfully detaining the same. He 
awarded the Plaintiff judgment of re~srtitution, rents up 
to the time set in the Notice to Quit, and damages there-
after which were, as is required by law, tripled. At the 
risk of incurring judgment for additional triple damages, 
the defendant Reichert still refused to surrender the 
premises and posted a supersede,as bond so that the 
plaintiff could not enforce his judgment of restitution. 
Reichert has continued to rent the premises to the L~aw­
lars and to collect rentals from them and the Lawlers, 
too, enjoying the protection of the supersedeas bond, 
have refused to vaeate the premises. 
The issue is whether the detaining of the property 
by Reichert and the Lawlers is unlawful. The answer 
lies in the law of titles and in the sp-ecific fields of re-
demptions from mortgage foreclosure S1ales and of home-
steads. If the detainer of the appellants is unlawful, 
the effect of that unlawful detainer is prescribed by 
statute and triple damages are mandatory, not permis-
SIVe. 
The basic propositions in the plaintiff's ~argument 
are as follows: 
1. Pacific National was the purchaser at the ·Sher-
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iff's sale on a mortgage foreclosure and, as such, took 
the prope-rty free and cle·ar ·of the home·ste,ad of the 
Lawlers. 
2. Reichert took an assignment of all the right, 
title and interest of Pacific National in the Ce-rtificate 
of S~ale and, so far as the Sheriff's s·ale is concerned, 
stood exactly in the shoes of the Pacific N ation,al. 
3. T·anner, complying in precise detail with the 
requirements of the statute, redeemed the property 
from Reichert. He redeemed by virtue of the judgment 
lien on the prop·erty accruing in an action against W. C. 
Lawler only. 
4. By virtue of this redemption, Tanner stood 
e:x:actly in the shoes of the purchaser at the Sheriff's 
s-ale, Pacific National, having all its right, title and in-
terest in the property, free from homestead. 
5. No person has redeemed the property from 
Tanner and the time for redemption has expired. 
6. Tanner, having been substituted to the position 
of Pacific N·ational by compliance \Yith the redemption 
statutes, is the owner of the property. 
ARGU~1:ENT 
POINT I 
WHEN WALTER H. REI·CHERT PURCHASED AN AS-
SIGNMENT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE FROM 
PACIFIC NATIONAL, HE RECEIVED ALL THE TITLE 
THAT PA:CIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED AS PUR-
·CHASER AT 'THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND NO MORE, AND 
HIS LA'TER ACQUISITION OF A QUIT-CLAIM DEED FROM 
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THE LAWLERS DID NOT 'TERMINATE THE MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND CUT OFF LIEN 
CREDI'TORS' RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION. 
A discus:sion of this point requires as background a 
survey ·of the law of redemption of re~al property from 
mortgage foreclosure sales. Since ther·e was no common 
law right of redemption after sale, the right is wholly 
a cre.~ture of statute. It should be remembered that 
there is a right to "redeem" property from mortgage 
foreclosure by paying off the mortgage before the 
she·riff's sale. That right did exist ·at common law, and 
it is mentioned here solely because, in examining the 
texts on real property and the reported cases, it is nec-
essary to keep in mind that we are conce-rned with re-
demption after sheriff's sale. The rules and discussions 
which apply to a "right to redeem" before sheriff's sale· 
are different and have no applicat~on to the case at bar. 
In Ut~h all rights of redemption arise under, and 
are limited by, the provisions of Rule 69 (f) U.R.C.P. 
(formerly § 104-37-30 et seq., U.C.A. 1943). The per-
tinent portions of that Rule are : 
"(f) Redemption from Sale. 
(1) Who May Redeem. Property sold sub-
ject to redemption, or any part sold separately, 
may be redeemed by the following persons or 
their successors in interest: ( 1) The judgment 
debtor; (2) a credit having a lien by judgment or 
mortg-age on the property sold, or on some shHre 
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the 
property was sold. 
(2) Redemption- How Made. At the time 
of redemption the person seeking the same may 
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10 
make payment of the amount required to the 
person from whom the property is being re-
deemed, or for him to the officer who made the 
sale, or his successor in office. At the same time 
the redemptioner must produce to the officer or 
person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve 
with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy 
of the docket of the judgment under which he 
c}aims the right rto redeem, or, if he redeems 
upon a mortgage ·Or other lien, a memorandum of 
the record thereof certifie:d by the recorder; (2) 
an assignment, properly aclmowledged or proved, 
whe·re the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; (3) .an affidavit by himself or his agent 
showing the amount then actually due on the lien. 
(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid. 
The property may be redeemed from the pur-
chaser within six months after the sale on pay-
ing the amount of his purchase with 6 per cent 
thereon in addition, together with the amount 
of any assessment or taxes, and .any reasonable 
sum for fire insurance and necessary m~ainten­
ance, upkeep, or rep·air of any improvements 
upon the property which the purchaser may have 
paid thereon after the purchase, with interest 
on such amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a 
creditor having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment un-
der which s1aid purchase was made, the amount 
of such lien, with interest. 
( 5) Where no Redemption is !fade. If no 
redemption is 1nade within six months after the 
sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to 
.a conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty 
days h·ave elapsed and no other redemption by 
a creditor has been made and notice thereof has 
been given, the }ast redemp·tioner, or his assignee, 
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11 
is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the expiration of 
six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor 
redeems, he must make the same payments as 
are required to effect a rede.mpti10n by a creditor. 
If the debtor redeems, the effect of the s:ale is 
terminated and he is restored to his estate. * * * " 
Many states have similar provisions, and the Cal-
ifornia provisions are almost exactly verbatim to ours. 
Inasmuch as all the questions raised by appellant have 
been discussed by the California Courts under their 
statute, the pertinent portion of it is set forth here: 
"California Code of Civil Procedure; Section 701 : 
Redemption; Persons Entitled To; Redemptions 
Defined. 
Property sold subject to redemption, as pro-
vided in the last seetion, or any part sold sepa-
rately, may be redeemed in the manner herein-
after provided, by the following persons, or their 
successors in interest: 
1. The judgment debtor, or his successor 
in intere~st, in the whole or any part of the pro-
perty; 
2. A creditor having a lien of judgment or 
mortgage on the property sold, or on some share 
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the 
property was sold. The persons mentioned in 
the second subdivision of thi's section are, in this 
Chapter termed redemptioners." 
It should be noted that both in Ut~ah and California 
there are two types of redemptions: (1) redemption by 
the judgment debtor, and (2) redemption by "a creditor 
having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the property 
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sold, or some share or part thereof, subsequent to that 
on which the property was ·sold." Persons of the second 
group are ealled "redemptioners." A careful distinction 
is necessary between the two types because of thB dif-
ference in the effect of their redemption. 
When. a ju·dgment debtor redeems, the effect of the 
foreclosure s.ale is terminated, and he is restored to 
his former e1state. This may, as in the ease at bar, have 
the disadvantage of restoring judgment liens previously 
cleared off the prop·erty by the foreclosure sale. 
When a "redemptioner" redeems, he takes the prop-
erty subject to redemption from him by the judgment 
debtor or by other lien or mortgage creditors. The 
redemti:oner takes his title from the "purch·aser" at 
the sheriff's sale .and gets no more and no less than 
the "purchaser" had. (This proposition is in issue and 
will be substantiated later on.) 
The appellant urges th,at Reichert has, in effect, 
"redeemed" the property from the sheriff's sale, and, 
because he later got a deed from the mortgage debtors, 
the Lawlers, his "redemption" terminates the effect of 
the sale just as if the judgment debtors h·ad redeemed as 
provided by statute. If this position were given credence 
by this Court, grave repercussions would be felt in the 
law of titles and 1nore problems 'vould arise than would 
be settled. 
The appellants argu1nent overlooks these facts: 
1. The ste·ps necessary to effect a reden1ption are 
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carefully prescribed by statute, so that everyone may 
know with certainty when a redemption ha;s occurred. 
2. None of the appellants redeemed as provided 
by statute. The Lawlers never attempted to, and Reich-
ert specifically and intentionally, ~and on the cle·ar advise 
of his counsel, did not redeem. (See Stipulation 25, 
R. 65 and 66). 
3. There is a great difference, cle~arly recognized 
by appellant's eounsel at the time he advised Reichert, 
between an assignment and a redemption, particul~arly 
where the judgment ·debtor or his successor is co~cerned. 
4. The purchaser at a sheriff's sale, or, as in this 
case, his assignee, may not, by the simple expedient of 
getting a quit-claim deed from the foreclosed judgment 
debtor, cut off the s~t~atutory rights of lien creditors to 
redeem. 
VVhat happened was this. After the sheriff's s~ale 
Reichert had the right to ~edeem as a judgment lien 
creditors of the Lawlers, but he was fifth in line, behind 
Paul Clowes, Idaho Grange Wholesale, the U. S. Gov-
ernment and the State of Utah. The Lawlers, or their 
assigns, couldn't redeem because if they did they would 
restore the outstanding liens in the amount of $7,571.4 7 
as first liens on the property, with the mortgage that 
had been prior to the liens satisfied by the sale and 
redemption. 
If Reichert took an "assignment" of the certificate 
o.f sale from P~acific N'ational, the judgment liens 
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wouldn't be restored on the property-so long as he got 
the assignment before he succeeded to the interest of 
the L~awlers. So, that is what he did. As Stipulation 25 
shows, when he made the arrangement to buy Pacific 
National's interest, John Lowe, attorney for Pacific 
National, thought he had in mind redeeming, and pre-
pared the papers accordingly. However, just before 
the papers were filed, Reichert called Judge Hansen, his 
attorney, to be sure the papers were in order. Judge 
Hansen specifically said, "It is the assignment we want, 
W~alter, not the redemption." So they started all over 
'again and made out an assignment. Nothing could be 
clearer than the evidence in this case that Reichert 
intended not to redeem. On the day following the assign-
ment, Reichert solidified his position by purchasing a 
quit-claim de.ed from the Lawlers, including their home-
stead interest, if any they had. 
Now, because a subsequent lien creditor exercised 
his right to redeem the property from Reichert, he 
(Reichert) seeks to twist his actions into the "equiva-
lent of redemption by the judgment debtor." Apparently 
the restorat~on of the judgment liens in retrospect 
appears to be a les~ser evil th~an it did in prospect. 
Especially since there is no law ·on whether the judg-
ment liens of other creditors are revived in a situation 
which is sp·ecifically not a redemption by the judgment 
debtor, but is "its equiv.alent." 
The statute terminating the effect of a foreclosure 
sale in case of redemption by the judgmen·t debtor is 
silent as to "equiV~alents." But, 'vhen read as a whole, 
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the statute is eloquently clear. Rule 69 (f) (2) provides 
that a person redeeming must do four things in addition 
to paying the correct amount of money: 
1. Prep1are and serve on the officer or person from 
whom he seeks to redeem a notice that he is redeeming. 
2. Serve with his notice a certified copy of the 
docket of the judgment undeT which he claims the right 
to redeem. In case of a judgment debtor like the Lawlers 
that would be a copy of the docket of the judgment of 
foreclosure, showing them to be the "judgment debtors," 
as the term is used in Rule 69 (f) ( 1) fixing the persons 
who may redeem. In the case ·of a judgment lien creditor 
like Reichert, a certified copy of the docket of the judg-
ment under which he acquired his judgment lien. 
3. Serve with hi~s notice a copy of his assignment 
properly .acknowledged ~and proved. If Reichert had 
sought t_o redeem as the Hssignee of the Lawlers (which 
he couldn't have done since he didn't get his deed from 
the Lawlers until the day after his "equivalent of rede.mp-
tion") he would have to furnish this document. If he 
sought to redeem under hi~s own judgment lien he would 
not. 
4. Serve with his notice an affidavit of himself or 
his agent showing the amount then actually due on his 
lien. This would apply only when ~a person other than 
the judgment debtor redeemed. 
The statute excludes "equivalents of redemption 
by a judgment debtor" by making so cert'ain and specific 
the requirementis for redemption that there can be no 
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uncertainty as to whether there has been a redemption, 
and, if so, under whose rights the redemption has been 
made. This is so that other lien creditors can tell 
whether their lien -has been restored, or whether they 
must exercise their right of redemption in order to avoid 
losing forever their rights to recover on their judgment 
through the particular property involved. It is also 
to protect the judgment debtor, in the event he wants to 
redeem after someone else has redeemed. Because of · 
the documents which must be prepared and served, he 
knows exactly from whom he must redeem and what he 
must p·ay. 
Great havoc would 'be wreaked in the law of titles 
if this court w·ere to hold, as appellant requests, that 
the assignee of the purch(~ser at the sheriff's 'sale can, 
by thereafter and within the six month redemption 
period getting a quit-claim deed from the foreclosed 
mortgagors, terminate the effect of the foreclosure sale 
just as if the judgment debtor had redeemed. To so hold 
would require a holding that the effect was the same 
whether or not the ·assignee intended to terminate the 
sale and restore the prior liens. To so hold in this case 
would require a holding that it had the effect of termin-
ating the sale and restoring the liens even when the 
assignee intended the transaction not to have the effect 
of redemption. And all purchasers at sheriff's sale, and 
their assigns and perhaps redemptioners, ,, ... ho later on, 
but within the six months, have protected their position 
by purchasing a quit-claim deed from the foreclosed 
mortgagors, will be held to have involuntarily restored 
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all the liens of persons who did not redeem. There are 
many cases where such deeds were obtained out of an 
abundance of caution. 
If this court adopts the position of appell1ant on this 
point all titles which have passed through sheriff's sales 
in the last eight years (or more) will have to be re-
examined and many will be thrown into utter confusion. 
When Reichert took the .assignment from Pacific 
National, he received the whole title sold by the Sheriff, 
which was all the right, title and interest of both W. C. 
and Laura M. Lawler, free from liens, but subject to 
redemption. When he thereafter obtained a quit-cl~aim 
deed from the Lawlers, he protected himself from re-
demption by them and, therefore, from a restoration of 
the other judgment liens, and that is what he intended 
to do. 
However, because there was included in the deed 
all the homestead of Lawlers, he claims that, even if he 
:fails on this point, T1anner must pay him an .additional 
$3,650.00 in order for his claimed redemption to be valid. 
As shown under the next point, that position, too, can-
not withstand analysis. 
POINT II 
WHEN EARL D. TANNER REDEEMED THE PROP-
ERTY FROM WALTER H. REICHERT HE R,ECEIVED ALL 
THE RIGHTS THAT PA·CIFIC NATIONAL HAD ACQUIRED 
AS PURCHASER AT 'THE SHERIFF'S SALE, AND N:OTH-
ING MORE, AND THEREFORE HE RECEIVED THE TITLE 
TO THE PROPERTY FREE FROM HOMESTEAD, BUT 
·SUBJECT ·TO REDEMPTION BY OTHER LIEN CREDITORS. 
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The discussion under this point, deals with the 
arguments raised by appellant under his Points 3 and 
4. Under those points appellant urges (1) Tanner, if 
he is to validly redeem from Reichert, must pay him 
the sum of $3,650.00 in ·addition to the amount already 
paid, for the reason that Reichert is the owner of the 
homestead interest of the Lawlers in this property, and 
(2) that Tanner has acquired none of the undivided one-
half interest of L.aura M. Lawler in the property, for 
the reason that the Clowes judgment, under which Tan-
ner redeemed, was against W. C. Lawler only. These 
points are joined here because if respondent's argument 
is sound it disposes of both contentions. 
The pertinent facts are these: the deed under which 
the Lawlers got the property passed title to them as 
joint tenants, the mortgage to Pacific National was sign-
·ed by both the Lawlers as mortgagors, the action to 
foreclose the mortgage was against both the Lawlers, 
inter alia, and both the Lawlers filed an Answer in the 
foreclosure suit. The judgment of Paul Clowes under 
which Tanner redeemed "~as against W. C. Lawler only 
and was, therefore, a lien on only his undivided one-half 
interest. Neither of the Lawlers set up any claim to a 
homestead in the property in their Answer in the fore-
closure suit, and neither of them filed a Declaration of 
Ho1nestead until Dece1nber 29, 1955, five months and 
twenty four days after the prop·erty "T.as sold at sheriff's 
sale. 
If Pacific N~ational, the purchaser at the foreclosure 
sale, took the property free from homeste~ad and if a 
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redemptioner t~akes his title from the purchaser at the 
sheriff's sale, the appellant must f.ail on both Point 3 
and Point 4, because Tanner would have received, by 
redemption, the title of Pacific National, which was 
the whole of the title of both Lawlers, free from home-
stead. 
How does one acquire a homestead interest~ Prior 
to 1947, when the eases cited by appellant were decided, 
there was no statutory method for selecting a homestead 
and one could select it even after· execution sale. On 
the theory that it is well to have certainty in titles, 
Judge David T. Lewis, then a legislator, introduced 
the bill which became Sec. 38-0-10, U. C. A., 1943, and 
is now Sec. 28-1-10, U. C. A., 1953. As passed, it was 
entitled "An Act Amending Section 38-0-10, U. C. A., 
1943, Relating to Homesteads and Providing for the 
Selection and Claiming Thereof by Declaration o.f Home-
stead Before Execution or Judicial Sale" and provides 
as follows: 
"28-1-10. Declaration of homestead-Pro-
cedure-Delivery and service of-Title of pur-
chaser at sale.-The Homestead must be selected 
and claimed by the homestead claimant by mak-
ing, signing and acknowledging a declaration of 
homeste.ad as provided in section 28-1-11, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, which declaration must, 
before the time stated in the notice of sale on 
execution, or on other judicial sale, as the time 
of sale, of premises in which the homestead is 
claimed, be delivered to and served upon the 
sheriff or other officer conducting the sale or 
recorded as provided in section 28-1-12, Utah 
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Code Annotated 1953. If no such claim is filed or 
served as herein provided, title shall pass to the 
purchaser at such sale free and clear of all home-
stead rights. (Italics added.) 
The Constitution of Utah, Article 22, Sec. 1, pro-
vides that the Legi'slature shall provide by law for the 
selection by each head of a family an exemption of a 
homestead. The Legislature, following the dictates of 
the Constitution that it provide for the selection of a 
homestead, did so. It provided that a man could claim 
a homestead, free from execution or sale, up to the time 
his "title" was converted into a "right of redemption", 
i. e., up to the moment of Sheriff's sale. Plaintiff believes 
the intention of the Legislature was to remove un-
certainty in titles and to set up a method of determining 
whether any homestead was claimed in a given parcel 
of land. The Constitution required the Legislature to 
provide for a selection of a homestead and it is plain-
tiff's belief that it is self evident that a provis~on requir-
ing a person to make a written selection of homestead 
so that all may know whether a hon1estead is claimed 
is both constitutional 'and wise. 
The L.awlers did not declare a ho1nestead by the 
time set for the Sheriff's sale, that is, 12 :00 o'clock noon 
on July 5, 1955, ·and they have never since had any right 
to do so. For that re~a:son the property passed to Pacific 
N~ati~onal free of homeste~ad ·and thereafter to Reichert 
free of homestead and to Tanner free of homeste.ad. 
Appellants clain1 that Sec. 28-1-10 is uncertain as 
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to the time for selection of a homestead. A simple re-
reading of the statute shows that a Declaration of Home-
stead may be made and filed or sHrved at any time up 
to the hour designated in the Sheriff's Notice of Sale 
as the hour when the sale is to take place. Nothing 
could be more clHar and certain. 
Appellants further claim that for ·the Lawlers to 
claim a homestead in the foreclosure proceedings would 
have been a useless act and therefore they should not 
be pre·judiced by their failure so to do. Unless a mort-
gagor who is being foreclosed is so gifted as to know, 
several months in advance of the sale, that his property 
will not bring, on sheriff's sale, a price greater than the 
amount of the mortgagee's claim, he cannot possibly 
tell whether claiming .a home·ste3;d in his Answer is a 
useless act. Since trained attorneys are not so gifted, 
it would be extraordinary to attribute such prescience 
to the Lawlers. 
Since neither of the Lawlers had filed a Declaration 
of Homestead withi~ the time prescribed by statute, 
Pacific N ation.al received from the Sheriff at the Sher-
iff's sule, the right, title and interest of the Lawle·rs, 
free from homestead. But, the appellant argues, Tanner 
is not the "purchaser" and does not partake of the 
benefit of Sec. 28-1-10. The answer is that Tanner stands 
exactly in the shoes of the "purchaser", having all the 
purch-aser's right, title· and interest, and no more or no 
less. 
By operation of law a redemption by a redemptioner 
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is the equivalent of an assignment of a sheriff's cert-
ificate of sale and the redemptioner stands in the shoes 
of the "p11;rchaser" at sheriff's sale. This rule is S() 
univers.ally adhered to by the courts of states having 
statutes such as ours -as to be beyond que-stioning. Fur-
ther, the rule h~as been specifically adopted in Utah by 
this Court in Dupee vs. Salt Lake Valley Loan and Trust 
Company, (1899) 20 U. 103, 57 P. 845, 77 Am. St. Rep. 
902, as follows : 
"By redeeming, the respondent became, by 
operation of law, the assignee of the purchaser 
and succeeded to his rights and no more." (Italics 
added) 
The text writers in discussing redemption as a basis 
of title state the law as follows: 
American Law of Property,_, ... olume 4 Section 
18.66 b.: 
"Redemption as a Basis of Title: 
Redemption from either .a ministerial or a 
judicial sale is a method of satisfying encum-
brances when made by an owner, and is a method 
of transferring ti tie or a prospect of title when 
made by a junior lienor or by anyone else who 
is entitled to be subrogated. 
The latter type of redenzption effects an 
assignment of the rights of the original purchaser 
and the redemption is 'vithin the tenns of the 
recording action to the sru11e extent as though he 
had tal\:en -an express assignment. ,,.. alidity of 
the transfer is to be judged by checking the re-
deeming party's rights under the statute to make 
redemption, or by ascertaining tl1at the redemp-
tionee has accepted the redemption monies." 
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The case law on the point is clear, unequivocal and 
directly in point. It was established prior to 1880 under 
a statute essentially the same as ours. 
The law on this point has been annotated at 135 ALR 
196 under an annotation entitled "Creditor or encum-
brancer redeeming from mortgage sale as acquiring title 
and rights of sale purchase~." The Utah case above is 
referred to as illustrating the following general rule: 
"Under most statutes, a creditor or junior 
encumbrancer who redeems from a mortgage sale 
succeeds to the title and rights of the mortgage-
sale purchaser." 
There is an excellent and complete 1954 annotation 
covering most of the points in dispute in this law suit 
in Cal. Jur. 2d, Executions, Sections 200 et seq. The 
effect of a redemption by a "redemptioner" (by defini-
tion a creditor of the mortgage debtor) is set forth in 
Section 219 thereof·as follows: 
"Section 219. Effect of redemption by credi-
tor of debtor-When property is redeemed from 
an execution sale by a redemptioner, the execution 
sale is not effected, and the redemption operates 
to transfer the rights of the purchaser at the sale 
as evidenced by the ceTtificate of sale. When the 
time for further redemption has expired, the 
Sheriff's deed is made to the final redemptioner 
instead of the original purchaser, and he suc-
ceeds to the title of the original purchase·r at 
the execution sale·." 
The Supreme Court of California des-cribes the 
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effect of such a transaction in McNutt vs. Nuevo Land 
Company, 167 Cal. 459, 140 P. 6, as follows: 
"The so-called redemption by a junior en-
cumbrancer is not in strict logic a · redemption, 
but is rather. a purchase of the rights and title 
acquired by the purchaser at the prior sale." 
Applying the law set forth above to this case, we 
get the following results: 
1. Pacific National purchased the property in dis-
pute at Sheriff's sale and received the title of both 
foreclosed joint tenants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M. 
Lawler, and by virtue of Sec. 28~1-10, took title free from 
homestead. As is the case in all judicial sales of real 
property, the title was subject to redemption. 
2. Reichert bought Pacific National's title, took an 
assignment of the certificate of sale, and stood exactly 
in Pacific National's shoes. 
3 .. Tanner redeemed and by operation of law receiv-
ed Pacific National's title, through Reichert, just as if 
Tanner had been a voluntary assignee. 
4. Tanner's title is free from homestead. 
POINT III 
THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER HAVING 
BEEN SOLD BY THE SHERIFF TO PACIFIC NATIONAL 
AT THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE, AND EARL 
D. TANNER HAVING SUCCEEDED ~To THE TITLE OF 
PACIFIC NATIONAL, THE SHERIFF WAS REQUIRED BY 
LAW TO CONVEY THE INTEREST OF LAURA M. LAWLER 
TO EARL D. TANNER. 
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The Appellants argue that a redemptioner whose 
right to redeem results from a judgment lien :against one 
of two joint tenants may not, by exercising his right 
to redeem, obtain any title as against the other co-tenant. 
This is the gist of their argument under Point Four and 
the conclusion appellants draw is that, even if T.anner's 
redemption were valid, he would receive only the title 
of .W. C. Lawler and the undivided one-half interest of 
Laura M. Lawler would return to her, presumably hav-
ing reverted from Pacific National or Reichert at the 
time of T1anner's redemption. This ,argument was placed 
before the Supreme Court of California in 1880 under 
a statute almost exactly like our and was rejected. See 
Eldridge vs. Wright, 55 Cal. 531, 6 P. C. L. J. 724 which 
holds- as follows : 
"Where land sold under judgment is em-
braced in one sale, a redemptioner, having a 
lien upon a sh.are or part of the land sold, can 
only redeem by paying the whole of the purchase 
money or redeeming the whole of the land; and 
in such cases he succeeds to the whole interest 
of the purchaser, and accordingly, where land 
was sold under a judgment of foreclosure against 
tenants in common, and redeemed by a judgment 
creditor of one of the tenants, who in due course 
received the deed, the redemption took the inter-
est of both tenants." 
A creditor having a lien on only a part of the 
property sold, has the right to redeem by statute. Rule 
69 (f) (1), U.R.C.P. says that "a creditor having a lien 
by judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or some 
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share or part thereof" may redeem. California has the 
same provision. 
There have been later cases in California dealing 
with the subject and the result of those cases is set 
forth in the annotation at 19 Cal. Jur. 2d referred to 
above as follows : 
"Prop·erties sold as a single lot or parcel 
must be redeemed as a whole; it cannot be re-
deemed piece meal. For example, where the sale 
is of the interest of all joint owners, the interest 
of one of the joint owners cannot be redeemed 
separately from the others ; and one who succeeds 
to a p'art of the total interest sold must redeem 
the whole or not at all." (19 Cal. Jur. 2d 640, 641) 
"Section 207.-Creditor of Co-tenant-If real 
property held in joint ownership is sold at execu-
tion sale, a creditor having a lien on the undivided 
interest of one co-tenant may redeem the whole, 
but has no right to redeem only the undivided 
interest of his de1btor. In case of such redemp-
tion, the redemptioner owes no duties to the co-
tenants of his debtor, and app,arantly, cannot 
assert any right of contribution as to that." 
As can be seen from the above authorities, not 
only did T:anner receive the ''""hole interest of both W. C. 
and Laura M. Lawler, but, in addition, it would have 
been impossible for him to obtain by redemption the 
undivided interest of either of them. The effect of Tan-
ner's redemption was to pass to him the whole inter~st 
of both the Lawler's, free from homestead, but subject 
to redemption. There was no subsequent redemption. 
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POINT IV 
NO CREDITORS HAVING REDEEMED THE PROPERTY 
FROM THE REDEMPTIONER EARL D. 'TANNER, HE WAS 
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A SHERIFF'S DEED SIX 
MONTHS AFTER THE SHERIFF'S SALE. 
Point Two of the appellant's brief is devoted to 
the proposition that the Sheriff was without ,authority 
to give a, Sheriff's deed to Tanner on January 6, 1956, 
for the reason that, although six months had expired 
from the date of the Sheriff's sale, sixty days had not 
expired from the time of the last redemption. Tanner 
having redeemed on Deeember 29, 1955. They point out 
that under respondents' view of the law, ·a redemptioner 
may redeem on the last day of the six month period and 
thus prevent a subsequent redemption, and urge that 
this would be unfair. That it is not unfair is apparent. 
Any person who has a right to be a "subsequent redemp-
tioner" has had the full six month period in which to be 
an "original redemptioner" if he had a bona fide desire 
to redeem. Any redemptioner may redeem by p·aying 
the purchaser at Sheriff's sale his bid price plus 6 percent 
If he waits for an intervening redemptioner to redeem 
he must pay the bid price plus 6 percent plus an addi-
tional 3 percent and plus the other redemptioner's lien. 
If he waits the whole six months to redeem it can hardly 
be called unfair to him that another may redeem on the 
last day. 
Rule 69 (f) ( 4) provides for subsequent redemp-
tions and states that "any other creditor having a right 
to redeem m·ay, within sixty days after the last redemp-
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tion and within six months after the sale" redeem the 
property from the last redemptioner. This clearly limits 
subsequent redemptions to a time which is never beyond 
six months from the date of the sheriff's sale and may 
be even earlier, since it may also never be more than 
sixty days after the last redemption. 
If this interp.ret,ation is sound, it would not matter 
even if the Sheriff had given Tanner a Sheriff's deed 
pre-maturely, because the time for subsequent redemp-
tions had expired. 
Of overriding significance in relation to this point, 
however, is the fact that no other creditor has sought 
to redeem from Tanner either within the six month 
period or within the six month period plus sixty days. 
Neither of the appellants have offered or attempted to 
redeem from Tanner at any time, nor tenderd to him or 
to the Sheriff for him the documents necessary to re-
demption or the money necessary to a suecessive redemp-
tion. The time in which such a successive redemption 
from Tanner could have been made under even the most 
liberal interpretation having long since passed and no 
redemption having been attempted or tendered, the 
question of whether the redemption period expired at the 
termination of six months or at the termination of sixty 
days after Tanner''S redemption is moot. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PRO·PERLY ENTERED A MONEY 
JUDGMEN'T AGAINST WALTER H. REI\CHERT. 
Point Five of appellant's brief questions the entry 
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of a money judgment against 'Valter Reichert, the 
intervener below. The claim is made that he was not 
in .actual possession of the premises and that he had 
no notice to quit. 
The facts in this regard are before this Court, as 
they were before the Court below, upon stipul,at~on of 
all parties, a stipulation presumably setting forth all 
facts, ultimate as well as evidentiary, that any party 
expected to rely on in this action. The portions of that 
stipulation pertinent to this point are Stipulations 19, 
20 .and 21, (R~ 62-3) as follows: 
19. Since December 29, 1955, the intervener 
has had possession of the above described prem-
ises by and through the defendants, W. C. Law-
ler and Laura M. Lawler, who claimed .and still 
cl~aim to be the tenants of the intervener, and 
the intervener refused and refuses to surrender 
the possession of said premises to the plaintiff. 
20. On or about January 19, 1956, plaintiff 
gave defendants notice to quit, requiring defen-
dants to vaeate the above described premises 
within seven days from the service of said notice, 
and had the same served in the manner provided 
by law. 
21. More than seven days have elapsed since 
the service of such notice, and the defendants 
have failed and refused to quit the above des-
cribed pre·mises 'and surrender the same to plain-
tiff. 
The stipulation was entered into after Reichert 
had, upon his own motion become a defendant and raises 
no questions of service of notice. The defendant, Reich-
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ert, apparently intended to rely below on his title· and 
not on any question of notice, and for that reason 
stipulated that "plaintiff gave defendants notice to 
quit." Under those circumstances, Reichert should not 
now be allowed to raise the point. 
This action was commenced against the Lawlers 
only, since the plaintiff was not aware that Reichert was 
the real party behind their refus~al to deliver up his 
property. On February 4, 1956, the Lawlers answered 
the Complaint saying {R-10): 
"6. ***these answering defendants allege 
that they are lawfully in the possession of the 
premises described in plaintiff's Complaint as 
tenants of Walter H. Reichert, the owner of 
such premises." 
Thereafter, on February 10, 1956, Reichert asked 
leave to intervene and become a party defendant to this 
unlawful detainer action on the following grounds, 
(R-12): 
"That the appellant (Reichert) claims to be 
the owner and entitled to the possession of the 
tract of land described in plaintiff's Complaint, 
subject only to the rights of the Defendants, 
Lawlers, to the possession thereof as tenants of 
the applicant." 
Permission being granted, Reichert filed his An-
swer as a defendant and his ~hird party complaint 
against the Sheriff. When issue ,v,as joined all round, 
the fact was stipulated as set forth above to the effect 
that Reichert was the person in possession of the prem-
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,• 
ises and that he was exercising his possession through 
the Lawlers. (Stipulation 19, R. 62). 
The law in this situation is clearly prescribed by 
Section 78-36-'7, U.C.A. 1953 as follows: (Italics added.) 
"78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.-No 
person other than the tenant of the premises, and 
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation 
of the premises when the action. is commenced, 
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding, 
nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff 
be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person 
who might have been made a party defendant; 
but when it appears that any of the parties served 
with process or appearing in the proceedings are 
guilty, judgment must be rendered against them. 
***" 
As is seen from the above statute, the court having 
found that Reichert who was "one of the parties appear-
ing in the proceedings" was guilty of unlawful detainer, 
the court was required by statute to render judgment 
against him. 
What kind of judgment~ Section 78-36-10 answers 
that question in detail, providing that judgment shall 
be entered for restitution of the premises as well as rent 
and three times any damages caused by the unlawful 
detainer. The treble damage provision is mandatory 
and not permissive, as held by this court in Forrester 
vs. Cook, 77 U. 137, 155, 292 P. 206. 
It would appear from reading Section 78-36-7 that 
entry of such a money judgment against Reichert, since 
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he is a party voluntarily appearing in the action and 
a party found guilty of unlawful detainer, is also man-
datory. Any other interpretation would simply be 
requiring the Court to waste time re-trying the same 
issues on the same facts in another action. 
POINT VI 
THIS ·COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT 
BELOW AND, IN ADDITION, DIRECT 'THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF BE AWARDED TRIPLE DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD 
WALTER H. REICHERT AND THE LAWLERS HAVE CON-
TINUED TO UNLAWFULLY DETAIN THE PROPERTY 
SINCE THE JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION. 
The trial court found the ultimate facts in favor 
of the plaintiff (R. 78 and 79) and concluded from those 
facts (R. 90), among other things, as follows: 
"4. Since January 26, 1956, the defendants, 
W. C. Lawler, Laura M. Lawler and Walter H. 
Reichert have unlawfully detained said propery 
and are now unlawfully detaining the same from 
the possession of the plaintiff. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
the defendants and each of them for unpaid rent-
als in the amount of $90.00, for damages in the 
amount of $500.00, being the actual dam'ages of 
$167.67 trebled, and for his costs and disburse-
ments herein." 
The judgment as to damages was based on the find-
ing, pursuant to stipulation, that the fair rental value 
of the premises is $100.00 per month. ·This Court has 
held th~at the rental value of the premises is the min-
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imum of darn'ages for unlawful withholding. Forrester 
vs. Cook, supra, point 15 of the decision: 
"While damages may not be restricted to the 
rental value and may include more, yet the rental 
value during the unlawful withholding of posses-
sion is the minimum of damages." (Italics added) 
On March 26, 1956, in conjunction with his Notice 
of Appeal, Reichert filed a cost bond in the amount of 
$300.00, in addition to a "Supersedeas Bond on Appeal" 
(R. 96), undertaking to stay execution on the trial 
court's judgment pending the appeal. The bond specii-
cally undertakes to p~ay "damages for delay" in the 
event the judgment is affirmed. The amount of the 
supersedeas bond is $1,000.00 and the plaintiff, in the 
belief, right or wrong, that the defendant Reichert is 
a man of substantial means, has made no objection to 
the amount, on the theory that, regardless of bond, s~aid 
defendant has the capacity to respond in damages 1n 
whatever amount may be awarded in this action. 
The filing of the supersedeas bond stays the execu-
tion of the money judgment and the judgment of restitu-
tion. The court having found, per stipulation, that Reich-
ert was in possession of the premises through the Law-
lers, any attempt to oust him by ousting the pe.rsons 
through whom he held possession would, in light of the 
supersedeas bond, have been tortious. 
It follows that, Reichert having elected to retain 
possession even when adjudged to be in unlawful 
detainer of the property, he must accept responsibility 
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for the penalties provided by law. Penalties he could 
have readily avoided by the simple expedient of sur-
rendering possession to the plaintiff pe~ding the outcome 
of this :app-eal. 
As noted in Forrester vs. Cook, supra, the minimum 
damages for unlawful detainer is the rental value, in 
this case, $100.00 per month. As further decided in 
the same case, where there is unlawful detainer, those 
damages must be tripled. It follows that in the event 
the judgment for the plaintiff is affirmed, this Court 
should either assess additional damages at $300.00 per 
month during the term of the appeal or remand the case 
to the trial court to fix the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment below and the within brief are based 
on these premises, all of which the respondents believe 
to be sound: 
1. \Vhen Reichert purchased the assignment of the 
Certificate of Sale from Pacific National, he obtained 
title subject to redemption. 
2. His later acquisition of a deed from the Lawlers 
did not revert ·hack .and convert his receipt of an "assign-
ment" of the certificate of sale into an involuntary 
"redemption by the judgment debtor." 
3. Reichert having had title subject to redemption 
and Tanner having redeemed, title is in Tanner. 
4. There is no outstanding homestead interest in 
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Reichert for the reason that neither of the Lawlers had 
made a timely Declaration of Homestead and therefore 
they had no homestead to assign to him. Further, the 
title Tanne·r took, being the title of the purchaser at the 
sheriff's sale, was, by operation of law, free and clear 
of homestead. 
5. Since a redemptioner succeeds to the title of the 
purchaser at the judgment sale, T.anner receivd the title 
of both Lawlers when he redeemd. 
6. Reichert, being guilty of unlawful det~ainer along 
. 
with the Lawlers, is subject to a money judgment and 
triple damages. 
For these reasons, respondents pray this Court for 
a decision affirming the judgment of the trial court 
.and assessing damages against both Reichert and the 
Lawlers for the period of the ap-peal at three times the 
rental value of the property withheld from the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. T'ANNER 
FRANK E. MOSS 
D. F. WILKINS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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